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PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS
Tax and Corporate Aspects of Professional Incorporation in
North Carolina
A common aspiration of many licensed professionals to enjoy the
legal right to practice in the corporate form in North Carolina was fulfilled
with the passage of the North Carolina Professional Corporation Act.'
Effective on January 1, 1970, this legislation is timely indeed. The pre-
dominant benefits available to professionals who practice within a corpo-
rate structure recently became more assured when the Internal Revenue
Service2 unexpectedly, albeit realistically, conceded that doctors, lawyers,
and others organized under state professional association or corporation
laws would, generally, be treated as corporations for federal tax purposes.
Both the tax and corporate advantages and limitations of professional
corporations will be discussed in this comment."
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Under section 7701 (a) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,5
which has been the same under all revenue acts,6 a "partnership" is in-
clusively defined as: "A syndicate, group, pool, joint venture or other
unincorporated organization . . . ."' It is necessary to look at section
7701 (a) (3) to determine what an "incorporated organization" is.
This section provides that "[t] he term 'corporation' includes associations,
joint stock companies, and insurance companies." The key word in this
definition-"association"--is not defined elsewhere in the Code. How-
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55B-1 to -15 (Supp. 1969). New York, Iowa, and Wy-
oming are the only states without some type of legislation allowing some or all
professionals to incorporate. P-H 1970 FED. TAXES, INCOmE 41,608.
Hereinafter referred to and cited as IRS.
T.I.R. 1019 (August 8, 1969), reprinted in P-H 1969 FED. TAXES, INcoB
55,334 (Aug. 14, 1969).
'For other sources dealing with different aspects of professional corporations,
see generally H. JoNES, PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS (PLI, Tax Law and Prac-
tice Handbook Number 14, 1969); Eaton, Professional Corporations and Associa-
tions in Perspective, 23 TAX L. Rnv. 1 (1967) ; Malone, Professional Corporations
-A Current Appraisal, 23 ARK. L. REv. 215 (1969); Scallen, Federal Income
Taxation of Professional Associations and Corporations, 49 MINN. L. REv. 603
(1965); Comment, Some Tax Problems of a Professional Association, 13 W.
RESERvE L. REv. 212 (1962).
' INT. REv. CODE of 1954 [hereinafter cited as CODE].
' Scallen, Federal Income Taxation of Professional Associations and Corpora-
tions, 49 MINN. L. REv. 603, 622 (1965).
" CODE § 7701 (a) (2) (emphasis added).
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ever, in Morrissey v. Commissioner8 the Supreme Court established
some judicial guidelines to determine the primary characteristics an organi-
zation, not formally incorporated under state law, must have in order to
be an "association" for federal tax purposes.
The Court held that a business trust having certain corporate charac-
teristics constituted an association taxable as a corporation within the
meaning of the Code. The important characteristics cited by the Court
were the following: beneficial interests being transferable without affect-
ing the continuity of the business; owners' liability being limited; an
owner's death neither terminating nor interrupting the business; manage-
ment of the business being centralized through representatives of the
owners; and title to the property being held within the entity.0
The IRS applied the criteria of Morrissey in Pelton v. Commissioner0
to win its first and last victory in the courts concerning the tax status
of a professional corporation. The court held that a medical group, which
ironically did not wish to be taxed as a corporation, more closely resembled
an association than a partnership for federal tax purposes. But with
the advent in popularity of corporate pension and profit-sharing plans in
addition to the increasing number of close corporations, the IRS was
ultimately destined to regret its victory in Pelton.
In United States v. Kintner,"' a group of doctors organized their
partnership into an "association," primarily to obtain the tax benefits
of a qualified corporate pension plan. The court held that the group
was an association taxable as a corporation even though a corporation
could not practice medicine at that time under the law of the appropriate
state. The court also emphasized that classification of an entity for federal
income tax purposes is a question of federal, rather than state, law.'
2
8296 U.S. 344 (1935).
Old. at 359.
1082 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1936).
"216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
Id. at 422; accord, Kurzner v. United States, 413 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1969);
Ahola v. United States, 300 F. Supp. 1055 (D. Minn. 1969); Williams v. United
States, 300 F. Supp. 928 (D. Minn. 1969); Foreman v. United States, 232 F.
Supp. 134 (S.D. Fla. 1964); Galt v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 360 (N.D. Tex.
1959). The following courts, while reaching the same result as that in Kinhier,
have held either expressly or impliedly that state law is determinative of whether an
entity is to be taxed as a corporation: O'Neill v. United States, 410 F.2d 888 (6th
Cir. 1969); United States v. Empey, 406 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1969); Smith v.
United States, 301 F. Supp. 1016 (D. Fla. 1969); Van Epps v. United States, 301 F.
Supp. 256 (D. Ariz. 1969); Cochran v. United States, 299 F. Supp. 1113 (D.
Ariz. 1969); Wallace v. United States, 294 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D. Ark. 1968).
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Applying federal law, the court found that the particular medical group
possessed more corporate characteristics under the tests of Morrissey
than attributes unique to a partnership.
13
The IRS initially refused to follow Kintner,'4 but in 1960 it promul-
gated regulations outlining the "resemblance test" from Morrisey for
determining a group's status as an "association." The regulations
closely adhered to the opinion in Kintner.5 However, contrary to the
court's refusal in Kintner to accord state law any importance in deter-
mining whether an organization is a corporation or a partnership for
tax purposes, the IRS emphasized that the presence of the characteristic
outlined in Morrissey would be governed by local law.' Since local
law in most states did not recognize professional groups as capable of
having any corporate characteristics, the motive behind the Treasury's
emphasis on local law is obvious. Not wishing to press the issue
judicially at that time, the professional groups turned to their state
legislators and asked them to provide for professional corporations that
would inherently possess the acceptable characteristics. The professionals
also received a partial response to their pressures from Congress in
the form of the Self-Employed Individual's Retirement Act.' Realizing
that the emphasis it had placed on local law was seriously backfiring, the
IRS amended its regulations in 1965 to provide that, regardless of state
labels, a "professional service organization" must meet the "resemblance
test" of Morrissey to be treated as a corporation.'
8
" The IRS attempted to equate this case with Mobile Bar Pilots' Ass'n v. Com-
missioner, 97 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1938), in which an association of pilots attempted
to be treated as a corporation for tax purposes. The court in Kintiwr distinguished
the two cases. It reasoned that the pilots' association would not have been liable
for any acts of its members, that the association owned no property and had no
income as an entity, and that the association was merely an agent of the pilots,
instead of their employer, because the owners of the vessels for whom the pilots
performed their services employed and controlled them. 216 F.2d at 423.
1" Rev. Rul. 56-23, 1956-1 Cum. BULL. 598. The Treasury later conceded
that an association of doctors could achieve corporate status if it possessed the
"necessary attributes." Rev. Rul. 57-546, 1957-2 Cum. BULL. 886.
" Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 (c) (1965), T.D. 6503, 1960-2 Cum. BULL. 412.
'1 GId.
"' Self-Employed Individual's Retirement Act, 76 Stat. 809 (1962). See CoDn
§§401(a), (c), (d) & (e) ; Treas. Reg. §§ 1.401-10 to -13 (1963). This provision
limits the amount a self-employed individual may invest in a qualified tax-
exempt pension plan to the lesser of ten per cent of his salary or 2500 dollars.
" Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(c) (1965). Treas. Reg. § 301. 7 701-2(a) (3) (1965)
provides that the "resemblance test" is determinative of the corporate tax treat-
ment and, furthermore, that the unincorporated organization seeking to be taxed
as an association must have more corporate characteristics than noncorporate
19701
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The amended regulations persuaded the professional groups that their
only recourse was additional judicial review. The courts were unanimous
in recognizing the validity of professional corporations although different
reasoning was applied to reach identical results.19 Not only did the IRS
finally concede the general validity of professional corporations, 20 but it
also indirectly apologized to the professionals and the courts for its his-
torical position by successfully supporting a Senate amendment to the
Tax Reform Act of 1969 that allows professionals the spoils of their
victory for the time being.21
II. TAX ADVANTAGES AND LIMITATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL
INCORPORATION
22
A. Employee Fringe Benefits
The primary and most tangible tax benefit derived from professional
incorporation is that the professional is treated as an employee of the
corporation for tax purposes. By gaining the status of an employee, the
professional can earn a straight salary from his corporation for his
services and receive certain fringe benefits not taxable to him as income.
characteristics, with characteristics common to both a corporation and a partner-
ship not to be considered.
In Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h) (1965), the IRS singles out professional ser-
vice organizations in particular and requires them to meet seemingly higher
standards than the "resemblance test." Court decisions have found this regula-
tion, which incorporates Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 (a) & (c) (1965), to be arbi-
trary and discriminatory against professional groups and thus an unreasonable and
invalid interpretation of COnE § 7701. See cases cited note 12 supra.
I" Compare O'Neill v. United States, 410 F.2d 888, 891 (6th Cir. 1969) and
United States v. Empey, 406 F.2d 157, 170 (10th Cir. 1969) (both holding that
the "resemblance test" of Morrissey might be applicable in determining the
corporate status of a business trust, but that state law is controlling as to whether
an entity is a "corporation" for tax purposes) with Kurzner v. United States,
413 F.2d 97, 112 (5th Cir. 1969) (holding that the "resemblance test" of Morrissey
is a valid criterion for determining whether an entity is a corporation for tax
purposes and that state law is not determinative).
" See note 3 supra. The IRS did not approve or disapprove the different theories
of the courts upholding professional corporations. Nevertheless, all of the cases
before the courts thus far have involved organizations with two or more profes-
sional employee-shareholders; different problems face the single professional who
wishes to incorporate. See pp. 586-89 infra.
21 115 CONG. REc. S162481 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 1969) (letter from Asst. Sec. of
Treasury Cohen to Senator Hruska supporting Senate Amend. 296 deleting § 901
of H.R. 13270, which imposed the "Keough" limitation on shareholder-employees
of professional service organizations) (the amendment passed 65 to 25).
" The term "professional corporation" is intended to apply to any organization
of professionals, including a professional association that is not formally in-
corporated under state law, if it is treated as a corporation for federal-tax purposes.
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In return, the employer-corporation may deduct the cost of such fringe
benefits from its income as an ordinary and necessary expense under
Code section 162(a) (1).
1. Pension and Profit-Sharing Plans
An employer-corporation can contribute, tax-exempt to an employee,
up to fifteen per cent of his salary to a qualified pension or profit-sharing
plan and even up to twenty-five per cent to a qualified combination of a
pension-and-profit-sharing plan:" The corporation's contribution to the
qualified fund for the benefit of the employee is immediately deductible to
the employer under Code section 404(a). The employee is not taxed until
a later distribution from the trust fund to him25 either in the form of a
lump-sum payment or a retirement annuity."6 Moreover, amounts remain-
ing unpaid from the pension or profit-sharing trust fund at the death
of the employee will be exempt from estate taxes if he has designated
a beneficiary other than his estate. 7 In summary, since earnings building
up within the trust fund are tax-exempt, the use of a qualified deferred-
compensation plan to accumulate a retirement portfolio amounts to an
investment in a tax shelter that cannot be found elsewhere in the Code."
The most important limitation on a pension or profit-sharing plan is
that it must be qualified under the Code. 9 A principal cause of a plan
"' CODE § 404(a) (3). A self-employed individual is only allowed to contribute
the lesser of 2500 dollars or ten per cent of his salary to a qualified plan. Id.
§ 404(e). See generally id. §§ 401-404.
2' CODE § 404(a) (7). The advantages to the higher-salaried employee of not
being taxed on an employer's contribution to the qualified trust fund is somewhat
lessened by the reduction in the Tax Reform Act of 1969 of the maximum income-
tax rate for individuals to fifty per cent. See Pub. L. No. 91-172 § 804(a) Dec. 30,
1959) adding CODE § 1348 (effective for taxable years after 1971).
-CODE § 402(a) (1).
"Before the Tax Reform Act of 1969, CODE § 402(a) (2) provided that the
taxable portion of a lump-sum distribution from a qualified deferred-compensation
plan would receive capital gains treatment if distribution was completed in one
taxable year of the employee. However, Pub. L. No. 91-172 § 515 (a) (Dec. 30,
1969) added CODE §§402(a) (5) & 403(a) (2) (c). These sections provide that the
portion of the lump sum contributed by the employer is taxable to the employee as
ordinary income, subject to a special maximum under new CODE § 7 2(n) (4).
" CODE § 2039(c). See CODE § 2517 for an available gift-tax exemption for the
employee to the extent of his own contributions to the plan if he irrevocably desig-
nates a beneficiary other than himself.
" For an excellent discussion of the suitability of the pension or profit-sharing
plan, or both, for certain professionals in various situations, see H. JoNEs, PRo-
PFEssioAL ConRoRATioxs (PLI, Tax Law and Practice Course Handbook Num-
ber 14, 1968).
" CODE § 401.
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failing to qualify is that it is discriminatory in coverage, contribution, or
benefits in favor of the higher-salaried employees. 80
An additional limitation is imposed by the Tax Reform Act of 1969
on the amount an employer-corporation can contribute to a qualified
plan for the benefit of an employee. If the employer has elected to be
taxed as a Subchapter S corporation,8" then the "Keough" limitation
8 2
will be imposed on the amount it can contribute for the benefit of a
shareholder-employee owning more than five per cent of the outstanding
stock without his having the contribution taxed as income.m
The future of the extensive and unique benefits available to an em-
ployee under a qualified pension or profit-sharing plan is uncertain; the
Treasury Department has undertaken an extensive review of all deferred-
compensation legislation. 4 The objective of this review is to eliminate
the distinction in the present law between qualified deferred-compensation
plans for self-employed persons and corporate employees." If extensive
changes tending to equalize the status of the two are forthcoming in the
near future, one of the principal incentives for professionals to incorporate
will be neutralized.
2. Wage-Continuation, Accident, and Health Plans
Another fringe benefit available to a professional as an employee of
the corporation is under Code section 105(d), which provides that an
employer may continue to make salary payments to a disabled employee
or purchase disability insurance that will accomplish the same results and
take a deduction for the payments or premiums.3 Furthermore, neither
the premiums nor the payments are taxable to the employee if they are
80 CODE 29 401 (a) (3)- (5). See Treas. Reg. 29 1.401-3 to -4 (1963). For treat-
ment of an unqualified pension or profit-sharing plan, see CODE § 403(c), ameided
by Pub. L. No. 91-172 §§ 321(b) & (d) (Dec. 30, 1969).
8 CODE 99 1371-78.8 See note 17 supra.
" Pub. L. No. 91-172 § 531 (a) (Dec. 30, 1969), which added CODE § 1379. If
the Subschapter S corporation contributes more than the amount allowed under the
"Keough" limitation, it will still get a deduction, but the excess will be taxed as
income to the employee. However, any amount taxed currently to a shareholder-
employee is to be recovered later by him tax-exempt under the annuity or lump-
sum-distribution rules of CODE § 72(n).
8 115 CONG. REc. S16248 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 1969) (letter from Asst. Sec. of
Treasury Cohen).8a Id.
8 CODE § 162. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-10 (1958).
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below one hundred dollars per week and comply with certain additional
limitations.37
The employer-corporation may also reimburse the employee for
expenses for medical care for himself, his spouse, and his dependents ;8
or the employer may pay the premiums on an accident and health in-
surance plan that provides compensation for expenses incurred by an
employee for personal injuries to or sickness of himself, his spouse, and
his dependents."0 In neither alternative are the payments normally taxable
as income to the employee-beneficiary,4 ° and in both alternatives, the pay-
ments are normally deductible by the employer as an ordinary and neces-
sary business expense."
In addition to utilization of employee-insurance plans to achieve
tax benefits for itself and its employees, the employer-corporation may
elect to be covered by workmen's compensation under section 97-1 of
the North Carolina General Statutes.' Under Code section 104(a) (1),
payments received by an employee under workmen's compensation are
generally tax-exempt.
3. Group Life Insurance and Death-Benefit Plans
The employer-corporation can purchase up to fifty thousand dollars
of group life insurance for each employee and deduct the premiums as
an ordinary and necessary business expense43 withdut the employee's
having to pay income taxes on the payments.44 The group insurance may
not be discriminatorily limited to the professional shareholder-employees
17 CODE § 105(d). See Treas. Reg. § 1.105-4 (1964).
8 CODE § 105(b). See Treas. Reg. § 1.105-2 (1956).
"' CODE § 106. See Treas. Reg. § 1.105-2 (1956). A self-employed individual's
deduction for medical expenses is allowed only to the extent that they exceed three
per cent of his adjusted gross income and are not covered by insurance. One half
of the individual's premiums not in excess of 150 dollars for insurance coverage
for himself, his spouse, and his dependents is also allowed as a deduction. CODE
§ 213.
40 CODE § 106. See Treas. Reg. § 1.105-2 (1956).
"CODE § 162. See Treas. Reg. § L162-10 (1958). Currently it is uncertain
whether medical-reimbursement and sick-pay plans can be discriminatorily limited
to the employees who are shareholders. But see Larkin v. Commissioner, 48 T.C.
629 (1967) (nondiscrimination test to a medical-reimbursement plan added).
However, as suggested by one writer, even though the law in this area is not
fully developed, it might be reasonable to relate benefits to service or salary and
thus effectively discriminate in favor of the shareholder-employee. Malone, Pro-
fessio ul Corporations-A Current Appraisal, 23 Aiuc. L. Rv. 215, 219 (1969).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-1 (1965).
48 CODE § 162. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-10 (1958).
" CODE § 79 (a).
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although the amount of coverage for which each employee is eligible
may be based on such factors as salary, years of service, position, or a
combination of factors. 5
The employer-corporation also may give five thousand dollars on the
death of an employee to his estate or beneficiary, and the payment is not
taxable as income to the employee' while it is deductible by the em-
ployer.4 7 The primary limitation to this tax-exempt benefit is that the
employee must not have had a nonforfeitable right to the payment im-
mediately before his death since such a right is considered the equivalent
of compensation due the employee for services.4"
B. Tax Problems of Shareholder-Employees
Since most professional-employees in a professional corporation will
also be shareholders, 49 deductions and other tax benefits to the corpora-
tion indirectly inure to the benefit of the shareholder-employee. Because
of the inherent control and a temptation to use it to achieve illegal tax
benefits, there are statutory and judicial limitations on the relationship
between the shareholder-employee and his employer-corporation to insure
that the relationship is bona fide and not used principally to avoid taxes
for which the corporation or shareholder would otherwise be liable.
1. Retained Earnings
The earnings of most professional corporations will usually be taxed
at a lower rate than if they are distributed in the form of salaries to
the professional employees;6° therefore, it will often be to the benefit of
the higher-paid employees for the corporation to retain some earnings for
future needs. Retained earnings could be invested in outside property
" Treas. Reg. §§ 1.79-1(b) (1) (b), & (d) (1966).
" CODE § 101 (b) (2).
" CODE § 162. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-10 (1958).
8 CODE § 101(b) (2) (B). See Treas. Reg. § 1.101-2(a) (2) (1957). Apparently
discrimination among employees in respect to this tax-free benefit is not only not
forbidden, but approaches the point of being required to prevent the implication
of a nonforfeitable right
"'The North Carolina Professional Incorporation Act, N.C. GEN. STAT.
§3 55B-1 to -15 (1969), as do similar acts in other states, limits stock ownership
in professional corporations to professionals licensed in the profession that the
corporation practices. However, it is not necessary for a shareholder to be an
employee of the corporation, nor is it necessary for a professional employee to own
stock in it. Id. at § 55B-4 (2).
" The normal federal tax is twenty-two per cent of the first 25,000 dollars of




or stock, and the professional corporation would receive an eighty-five per
cent "dividends received deduction" for dividends from stock in another
corporation.5 To control such a situation, there are certain statutory
limitations not only on the amount of earnings that may be retained,
but also on the feasibility of retaining any earnings at all.
Under Code section 531, there is a penalty tax on any earnings and
profits retained in excess of 100,000 dollars that are "beyond the reason-
able needs of the business."5" Exactly what constitutes the "reasonable
needs" of professional corporations is uncertain.53 It is unlikely that most
professional corporations would need large amounts of retained earnings
for future capital assets or retirement of debts. One primary reason for
most professional corporations to retain and reinvest earnings and profits
will be to build up a ready fund to redeem the stock of a retiring share-
holder-employee under a redemption agreement.54 In Mountain State
Steel Foundries, Inc. v. Commissioner,5" the retention of earnings and
profits by a corporation for stock redemption purposes was held to be a
reasonable need of the business. There have been decisions to the
contrary," but notwithstanding this conflict, under section 55B-7(b) of
the North Carolina General Statutes, the professional corporation is
required to redeem a deceased stockholder's shares within one year of
his death if the remaining shareholders choose not to purchase them.
1 Id. § 243.
' Id. §§ 531- to -37.
For a good discussion of "reasonable needs of the business," see BiTTR
EUSTIcE, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS
§§ 6.03'-.07 (2d ed. 1966; Supp. 1969) [hereinafter cited as BITTKER].
" Under most circumstances the corporate redemption agreement is far superior
to the shareholder buy-sell agreement. The danger of a shareholder buy-sell agree-
ment is that when one stockholder wishes to retire, the remaining shareholders
may not have the liquidity to purchase his stock. If the remaining shareholders
attempt to assign the buy-sell agreement to the corporation or attempt to use
corporate funds to purchase the shares, the "loan" by the corporation could be taxed
to the buying shareholders as a constructive dividend or discharge of their in-
debtedness. E.g., Wall v. United States, 164 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1947). See 2 F.
O'NEILL, CLosE CORPORATIONS § 7.13 (1958).
284 F.2d 737 (4th Cir. 1960).
See, e.g., Pelton Steel Casting Co. v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 278 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 356 U.S. 958 (1958) (corporate accumulations for stock redemptions
of controlling shareholder not a valid reasonable need of the business); BITTKER
§ 6.07. Professor Bittker points out that the importance of a redemption to a
corporation's business activities is often tenuous or debatable while the interest
of the remaining shareholders in achieving an increase in their proportional control
is obvious. He suggests caution as a result of the unsettled state of the law,
,especially if the contemplated redemption is not likely to occur until a distant
future date.
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Thus the accumulation of earnings by a professional corporation for future
redemptions may not only be a "reasonable need" of the business but
also one necessary to maintain existence since the Secretary of State
of North Carolina must revoke a professional corporation's charter unless
the deceased stockholder's shares are either redeemed or purchased by the
remaining shareholders." It may be significant that the Tax Reform Act
of 1969 contains an amendment to Code section 537 redefining "reasonable
needs of the business" to include amounts needed, or reasonably anticipated
to be needed, to redeem stock under Code section 303 for the payment
of death taxes of a deceased shareholder. "'
A more costly but objective limitation on the feasibility of a profes-
sional corporation's retaining any earnings or profits undistributed in
salaries or dividends is Code section 541, which pertains to personal hold-
ing companies. If a corporation meets criteria so that it can be classified as
a personal holding company, then all of its undistributed personal-holding-
company income will be subject to a confiscatory tax of seventy per cent.50
To be classified as a personal holding company, more than fifty per cent of
a professional corporation's stock must be owned actually or constructively
by five or fewer individuals, 0 and, in addition, sixty per cent or more
of the corporation's adjusted ordinary gross income must be "personal-
holding-company" income.61 Since substantially all of a professional
corporation's income will be derived from the rendering of personal
services by the employees to clients or patients, Code section 543 (a) (7),
which characterizes income derived from personal-service contracts, is
highly important. Income for personal services under this provision will
be deemed personal-holding-company income only if the recipient of the
r 7N.C. GEN. STAT. §55B-7(b) (1968).
" Pub. L. No. 91-172 § 906 (Dec. 30, 1969) amending CoDE § 537. The amend-
ment provides that the reasonable needs of the business (CODE § 537) include
amounts needed (or reasonably anticipated to be needed) in the year of death
and subsequent years to redeem stock to pay death taxes (CODE § 303). S. REP.
No. 552, 97st Congress, 1st Sess. 11 (1969). A reasonable interpretation of this
provision is that the accumulations under CODE § 537 for a redemption under
CODE § 303 must be in the year of death of the shareholder, or later, to be char-
acterized as a reasonable need of the business. E.g., P-H, 1970 FED. TAXEs, REP.
BuLL. 1, § 230. Nevertheless, it would seem that the logical intent of Congress
and a possible interpretation would be that accumulations before the death of
a shareholder whose stock is to be redeemed under CODE § 303 is a reasonable
need of the business.
"' CODE § 542. See Comment, Some Tax Problems of a Professimoal Associa-
tion, 13 W. REsERvE L. Rnv. 212, 221 (1962).
" CODE § 542(a) (2).
" Id. 542(a) (1).
[V9ol. 48
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services is able, under a contract expressed or implied, to designate who
must perform them and if the person who may be designated owns, either
actually or constructively, twenty-five per cent or more of the corpora-
tion's outstanding stock. Of course, the ability of the recipient of personal
services to designate who must perform them will often be determined by
the practices and procedures of a particular professional corporation.62
The statutory prohibition on personal-holding-company income was
primarily aimed at persons in the entertainment world who incorporate,3
and the statute has questionable applicability to a bona fide professional
corporation rendering personal services to the public and owning sub-
stantial capital assets."' It is obvious from the legislative history that
the statute was not intended to cover personal service organizations of
the character of a professional corporation:
[T]he [client's right of designation] will prevent this rule from apply-
ing in general to operating corporations engaged primarily in rendering
personal services .... Thus corporations which let out the services of
architects, engineers, and advertisers would not as a general rule be
required to report such income as P.H.C. income.65
Because there may be some risk of confiscatory taxes on retained
personal-holding-company income66 or penalty taxes on retained earnings
and profits beyond the reasonable needs of the business,67 the corpora-
tion may determine that its most feasible course of action is to distribute
any potential excess income to its professional employees in the form of
higher salaries by a percentage-bonus arrangement.6 " If the recipient
02 For example, a client or patient often is not or cannot be particular about
which doctor or lawyer in a partnership performs the services. However, when
a sole professional incorporates, he is the only the professional employee available
to render the necessary services, and the right of designation is automatic. Thus
the corporation with a sole professional employee will almost certainly meet the
tests of a personal holding company. E.g., Kurt Frings Agency, Inc., 42 T.C.
472 (1964), af'd 351 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1965) (personal-holding-company status
found when actor-clients of one-man artist's representative corporation relied on
owner's personal reputation, skill, and contacts).
" See Treas. Reg. § 1.543-1(b) (8) (1964). See also BITTKER § 620, at 239.
:'But see note 62 supra.
I H.R. REP. No. 1546, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1937). See also S. REP. No.
1242, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1937).
:' CODE § 541.071d. § 531.
as Under Treas. Reg. § 1.162-9 (1958), the IRS recognizes bonuses to employees
as allowable ordinary and necessary business expenses of a corporation under CODE
§ 162 when such payments are made in good faith and as additional compensation
for services actually rendered. But such payments when added to the stipulated
19701.
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professional employees are. shareholders who are in control of the corpo-
ration's affairs and decisions, the IRS is justified in closely scrutinizing
-the distributions to determine if the so-called "bonus compensation" for
services rendered is in reality a disguised dividend."0 A percentage bonus
arrangement with all shareholder-employees that is contingent on excess
corporate income after the corporate base salaries and expenses have
been deducted may tend to be reasonable compensation, but payments
under such an agreement could be attacked as constructive dividends. 0
Despite this possibility, a challenge for unreasonable compensation prob-
"ably will not occur if the corporation does not realize substantial income
from sources other than the rendering of personal services by its
professional employees. 1
2. Disregard of the Corporate Entity
The shareholder-employees of professional corporations face an addi-
tional, albeit vague, limitation under Code section 269, which prohibits
the acquiring of a corporation for the principal purpose of avoiding or
evading taxes by securing benefits of deductions, credits, or other allow-
ances that the shareholder-employees would not have otherwise en-
salaries must not exceed a reasonable compensation for the services rendered by
the recipient. If such a bonus is found to be legitimate compensation, it seems
logical to presume that a percentage of the bonus can be contributed by the em-
ployer to a pension plan. See CODE § 404(a) (3).
". See Northlich, Stolley, Inc. v. United States, 368 F.2d 272, 278 (Ct. Cl.
1966). Obviously the IRS would prefer to have bonus payments, deductible by
the corporation under CODE § 162 if they are reasonable compensation, treated as
constructive dividends, which are not deductible by the corporation. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.162-7 (1958). If the corporation pays taxes on the payments as distributed
dividends, the payments will also be taxed to the individual as income. Thus the
dividends will be subject to the disadvantage of double taxation.
"°In Irby Constr. Co. v. United States, 290 F.2d 824, 827 (Ct. Cl. 1961), the
court pointed out that a "bonus-type contract which is reasonable with a non-
stockholder employee may be unreasonable if made with a large stockholder, since
the incentive of the bonus would presumably not be needed to call forth the stock-
holder's best efforts." See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.162-7 & -8 (1958), which indicate that
it is extremely likely that the IRS would seek to treat as dividends any "bonus"
distributions made pro rata with respect to stock ownership. See also Treas. Reg.
§ 1.301-1 (c).
"' Compare Klamath Medical Service Bureau v. Commissioner, 261 F.2d 842
(9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 966 (1959), 'with McClung Hosp., Inc.,
1960 P-H Tax. Ct. Mem. 160,086 (1960). Read together, these cases lead to the
conclusion that a salary not in excess of one-hundred per cent of the stockholder's
billing is acceptable, but anything more can create trouble for the professional
corporation. See Comment, Some Tax Problems of a Professional Association,
13 W. REsER E L. Rnv. 212, 217 (1962).
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joyed. 2 This statutory limitation, in addition to Code section 482
allowing the IRS under given circumstances to allocate income or deduc-
tions between two or more businesses controlled by the same taxpayer,7"
is more or less a codfiication of the judicial doctrines disregarding a
corporate entity when it is a sham74 or has no real business purpose. 5
However, if the professional corporation actively engages in business and
renders services to the public, pays due respect to the "niceties" of corpo-
rate procedure and law,7 and does not attempt to split the single entity
into multiple entities7 7 then the IRS would be unlikely to succeed in
"2Although CODE § 269 refers to an "acquisition" of a corporation and is
usually confined to corporate reorganizations or the establishment of multi-corpora-
tions in place of one, the provision can apply to the original creation of a corpo-
ration by a transfer under CODE § 351. See Borge v. Commissioner, 405 F.2d 673
(2d Cir. 1968) ; James Realty Co. v. United States, 280 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1960) ;
Coastal Oil Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 396 (4th Cir. 1957). See also
Treas. Reg. § 1.269-3(b) (1962).
The sanction for violating CODE § 269 is the disallowance of the deduction,
credit, or other allowance. CODE §269(a). However, the applicability of CODE
§ 269 to original incorporation by a former partnership is rendered extremely ques-
tionable by CODE § 269(c), which raises a presumption that CODE § 269 is applicable
in case of a disproportionate purchase price for the acquired entity. Obviously
there can only be a disproportionate purchase price if the corporation had been in
existence prior to the acquisition, and this situation is unlikely in the case of
professional corporations.
' See, e.g., Borge v. Commissioner, 405 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1568).
7' E.g., Advance Mach. Exch., Inc. v. Commissioner, 196 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 835 (1952) ; Commissioner v. Laughton, 113 F.2d 103 (9th
Cir. 1940); Shaw Constr. Co., 35 T.C. 1102 (1961); Aldon Homes, Inc., 33 T.C.
582 (1959). See BIrTrxE § 1132, at 680. The sham-corporation treatment has
usually been restricted either to entertainers who incorporate or to the establish-
ment of multi-corporations in place of one. If the corporation is regarded as a sham,
its income is taxed to the shareholders.
"'E.g., Pauline W. Ach, 42 T.C. 114 (1964), aff'd, 358 F.2d 342 (9th Cir.
1966); Arthur T. Beckett, 41 T.C. 386 (1963).
"The decisions recognizing the validity of professional corporations for tax
purposes have emphasized the observance of such practices as making formal
corporate contracts with professional employees, billing the client or patient in
the name of the corporation, having bank accounts in the corporate name, and
having regular meetings of the board of directors and shareholders. A loan to the
corporation by an outside creditor without his requiring a shareholder's indorse-
ment is good evidence of independent corporate existence. E.g., Kurzner v. United
States, 413 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Empey, 406 F.2d 157 (10th
Cir. 1969); Holder v. United States, 289 F. Supp. 160 (N.D. Ga. 1968). Failure
to observe these formal practices can have serious tax consequences. See Jerome
Roubik, 53 P-H TAx CT. REP. § 53.36 (Dec. 12, 1969) (holding a corporation
formed by a group of doctors a sham because there were no corporate assets and
usual corporate records were not kept).
" Some professionals may decide either to form or to maintain an existing
separate leasing corporation to provide the capital assets and possibly the services
of non-professional employees for the professional corporation. However, the IRS
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attacking the corporation with these statutory or judicial weapons. 78
3. The Professional Corporation with One Shareholder-Employee
Notwithstanding the unanimously favorable judicial decisions recog-
nizing the validity of professional corporations7 and the Treasury's
acquiescence in those decisions,80 the sole professional who wishes to
incorporate and derive the benefits of being treated as an "employee" of
his corporation is faced with perplexing statutory and judicial obstacles.
No case has involved a professional corporation with only one shareholder-
employee," and the IRS has not expressly conceded the validity of this
type of professional corporation. 2 Nevertheless, if the courts adopt
Morrissey's "resemblance test ' 'm as determinative of whether a profes-
sional corporation will in fact be accepted as a corporation for federal
tax purposes and reject the state label of "corporation" as decisive,8 4 a
professional corporation with a sole shareholder-employee probably would
qualify.8, But even if the organization with one shareholder does qualify
may attack one or both of the corporations under CODE §§ 1551, 482, or 269, espe-
cially if the stock of both corporations is owned pro rata by the shareholder-
employees. In addition, any pension or profit-sharing plan would almost certainly
be attacked as discriminatory if the leasing corporation did not have a suitable and
comparable deferred compensation plan for its non-professional employees. See
CODE §§ 401 (a) (3) & (5); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.401-3, 4 (1963).
"8See Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 438-39 (1943), in
which the Court stated: "Whether the purpose be to gain an advantage under the
law of the state of incorporation ... so long as that purpose is the equivalent of
business activity or is followed by the carrying on of business by the corporation,
the corporation remains a separate taxable entity." See also O'Neill v. United
States, 410 F.2d 888, 891 (6th Cir. 1969).
79See note 12 supra.80See note 3 supra.
81In Kurzner v. United States, 413 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1969), the professional
corporation had only two shareholder-employees." In T.I.R. 1019 (Aug. 8, 1969) reprinted in P.H. 1969 FED. TAxES, INcoME
9J55.334 (Aug. 14, 1969), the IRS conceded the generat validity of professional
corporations organized under state statutes similar to those in Kurzner v. United
States, 413 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1969) and United States v. Empey, 406 F.2d 157
(10th Cir. 1969), but it reserved the right to contest any professional corporation
under specia circiostances not present in either of these cases.
" See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
"'E.g., Kurzner v. United States, 413 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1969). This opinion is
probably the best and most thoroughly reasoned one concerning professional corpo-
rations.
" A sole shareholder-employee of a professional corporation will find that his
liability usually is limited only with respect to corporate debts. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 55B-9 (Supp. 1969). But this situation is not unlike that faced by any sole
shareholder-employee of any business corporation. With respect to continuity of
interest, if the sole shareholder dies, the corporate entity will continue to exist,
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as a corporation under the Code, the unfortunate sole professional is
still faced with additional tax limitations.
In order to enjoy the various non-taxable fringe benefits, such as
a qualified deferred compensation plan, the sole professional who in-
corporates must qualify as an employee of his corporation, not as a self-
employed individual.8 6 Although the IRS has adopted the general
common law test of control as determinative of whether a particular person
is an employee of another, 7 the only definition of an employee found in
the Code is in section 3401 (c), which deals with an employer's withhold-
ing of an employee's taxes. This section states: "For purposes of this
chapter, the term 'employee' includes . . . an officer of a corporation."
The Treasury Regulations also provide that "generally, an officer of
a corporation is an employee of the corporation." 8 This statement is
presumably qualified by the language: "However, an officer of a corpora-
tion who as such does not perform any services or performs only minor
services and who neither receives nor is entitled to receive . . . any
remuneration is not considered to be an employee of the corporation."'"
Finally, the regulations state that "an employer may be an individual, a
corporation . . . ."90 From the literal language of the Code and the
accompanying Treasury Regulations, it would appear that the sole pro-
fessional could incorporate, become an officer of his corporation, be
treated as an employee of the corporation, and thus be qualified for non-
taxable fringe benefits.
although only for a limited time unless some other person is willing and able
to carry on the business. Id. § 55B-7 (Supp. 1969). Transferability of shares in
the corporation is restricted only in the sense that the transferee must be a licensed
professional, a limitation not unlike those accomplished by agreements among
shareholders in close corporations. Id. § 55B-6 (Supp. 1969). Management, of
course, is inherently centralized in the sole shareholder-employee although he may
have other licensed professionals on his board of directors.
Under Morrissey's "resemblance test" as applied in Kurzner v. United States,
413 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1969), the professional corporation controlled by a sole
shareholder-employee would almost certainly qualify as a corporation under the
Code. It would possess at least two and probably three of the four requirements
established in Morrissey. The court in Kurzner emphasized that if the pro-
fessional corporation under scrutiny closely resembles traditionally recognized
corporations, to treat it differently from the others would be arbitrary and dis-
criminatory. 413 F.2d at 111.
8 0Cf. CODE § 7701 (a) (20).
67 Treas. Reg. § 31.3401-1(b) (1957).
Treas. Reg. § 31.3401(c)-1(f) (1957).
8' This qualification would not be relevant to the sole professional who incorpo-
rates and continues his practice."0 Treas. Reg. § 31.3401(d)-1 (c) (1957).
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However, if the common law test of control pre-empts Code section
3401 (c) in determining whether an officer is an employee of a corporation
in a given case, it would seem that the sole shareholder-employee of a
professional corporation would have to be considered an "independent
contractor" since he has complete control of himself. But if the common
law test is really applicable in determining the status of every employee
of a corporation, Code section 3401(c) is mere surplusage. Therefore,
it seems logical to assume that this provision should be read to include
as an employee of a corporation any active officer, regardless of whether
that officer is also the sole shareholder-employee.9 1
Even if the IRS concedes that the sole shareholder of a corporation
can be an employee for federal tax purposes, it still has available the
statutory weapons of Code sections 269 and 482 and the judicial precedents
regarding sham corporations and those that lack a real "business pur-
pose.""2 Undoubtedly, the IRS has a better chance of success against one-
shareholder professional corporations than against the ones having two
or more shareholder-employees.9" Highly-paid entertainers, who have
attempted to incorporate their talents in order to avoid taxes in one way
or another, have consistently been victims of successful attacks.04
In Borge v. Commissioner,95 an entertainer bought a chicken farm
that was destined to lose money for a few years. The entertainer in-
corporated the farm, contracted his service to the corporation for a salary
substantially less than their worth, and the corporation sold his services
at a high profit, which it off-set against its losses on the chicken farm.
The IRS was successful in its challenge to both the entertainer and his
corporation under Code sections 269 and 482.9" Notwithstanding Borge
91It is highly unlikely that the courts will distinguish between the sole pro-
fessional who incorporates and controls himself and the payment of his wages and
any other individual owner of a regular business who incorporates and becomes
the controlling shareholder.
92See notes 72-78 and accompanying text supra.
"If for no other reason, the courts will not be reluctant to disregard the
corporation if the sole shareholder-employee is guilty of disregarding it himself
in the course of his business.
"E.g., Borge v. Commissioner, 405 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1968); United States
v. Johannson, 336 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1964); Laughton v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d
103 (9th Cir. 1940).
"405 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1968).
"Under CODE § 269 the IRS can refuse "a deduction, credit or other allow-
ance" that the taxpayer would not have otherwise had if he has an improper
motive in acquiring the corporation. Does "other allowance" mean "income"
that is not included in an employee's gross income, such as an employer's contribu-
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and similar results in other cases, it is perfectly proper for an individual
to arrange his business affairs so as to minimize taxes. 7 In cases in
which the IRS has successfully attacked a personal-service corporation
under sections 269 or 482 or under the theory that it is a sham, it has been
evident that the corporation existed not to serve a corporate business
purpose but merely to serve a shareholder's purpose in evading taxes.
And, as in Borge, there was usually a sole stockholder involved who
attempted by some device to derive indirectly a tax benefit from his posi-
tion as a shareholder.
As long as the sole professional who incorporates does not contract
his services to the corporation at substantially less than their value, there
seems to be no reasonable justification for treating him any differently
for tax purposes from any other sole owner-employee of any incorporated
business conducting bona fide operations. Furthermore, every court
that has recognized the existence of the professional corporation has
emphasized that it must be treated no differently by the IRS than any
other close business corporation."
III. PRINCIPAL CORPORATE ADVANTAGES AND LIMITATIONS
The corporation is, with all things considered, a "utilitarian vehicle
for conducting business affairs; it is more manageable in connection
with estate planning and probate than either partnerships or proprietor-
ships; and it is potentially as convenient for professional activity as for
ordinary business."'' 9 The North Carolina Professional Incorporation
Act 0 represents a tacit legislative rejection of the traditional common
law"0 and statutory prohibitions' ° against the practice of a profession
lion to a qualified pension plan? Such a fringe benefit is not a "deduction" under
the Code. See, e.g., CODE § 105(d).
"E.g., Ach v. Commissioner, 358 F.2d 342, 343 (9th Cir. 1966).
" E.g., Kurzner v. United States, 413 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1969). The judicial
implications have been clear: if the corner hardware store, incorporated and totally
owned by "Mr. Business," is to be treated as a "corporation" under the Code, then
so is a personal-service corporation solely owned and operated by "Mr. Profes-
sional."
" Eaton, Professionma Corporations and Associations in Perspective, 23 TAx L.
REv. 1, 22 (1967).
... N.C. GuN. STAT. §§ 55B-1 to -15 (Supp. 1969).
1. Parker v. Panama City, 151 So. 2d 469 (Fla. App. 1963) (in the absence
of express statutory authority, a corporation cannot lawfully engage in the practice
of a learned professional).
E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-5 (1965), amended (Supp. 1969) (formerly pro-
hibiting the practice of law by a corporation).
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by the corporate entity, -prohibitions' generally thouight to be based on
the essentially .personal relationship existing between the lawyer and his
clitnt, or the doctor and his patient. With respect to both law and medi-
cine, the noncorpora'te' status of practitioners was often thought necessary
in order to preserve for the client or patient the benefit of a highly con-
fidential relationship, based upon personal confidence, ability; and in-
tegrity."0 3 However, it hardly seems tenable that corporate status could
materially affect the desired relationship between the professional and
the person to whom he renders services. 1 4 Moreover, present realities
have cast gravd doubts on the validity of' the reasons supporting the
,traditional prohibitions against professionals operating within a corporate
-structure.
The public demand for more and better-trained professionals is in-
creasing at a rate exceeding the limited output. As pointed out by Senator
Percy in a speech before the Senate, 0 5 equal corporate' tax treatment of
the professional corporation will necessarily encourage many professionals
to utilize the corporate vehicle in their practice. And, according to Senator
Percy, the tax and operational characteristics of a corporation, as opposed
to those of the traditional partnership, will afford medical, legal, and
other professionals an .opportunity to make more efficient and economical
use of multi-.peciality group practices. The ultimate beneficiary of more
efficient group or team practice would be the average citizen whoseneeds demand more efficient professional aid.'
The North Carolina Professional Incorporation Act incorporates the
provisions of, the Busin ess Incorporation Act,' ' but provides express
limitations necessary to assure the continuing integrity of the professions)1 s
The Act endows the professional corporation with characteristics that
not only should distinguish the corporate entity from the traditional
'"ali re Florida Bar, 133 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1961).
'o Both the American Bar Association and the American Medical Association
have taken the position that it is not unethical for their members to organize in
the form of a professional association or corporation. But the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants has said that one of its members may not be "an
officer, director, stockholder, representative or agent of any corporation engaged in
the practice of public accounting." H. JoNEs, PROFEssixiAL CopoATioNs 32
(PLI, Tax Law and Practice Course Handbook Number 14, 1969).
... 115 CONG. REc. S16243 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 1968).
106 Id.
... N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-1 to -175 (1964).
.. Id. § 55B-3 (Supp. 1969). The Act also vests a general power in the li-
censing board of each profession to regulate its licensees in respect to any rules
or regulations that it may adopt regarding their right to incorporate.
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partnership for tax purposes, but that also afford the entity with opera-
tional advantages not found in the traditional partnership. 10 9
A. Continuity of Existence and Transferability of Interest
Unlike the traditional partnership, the professional corporation will
possess a continuity of existence despite the retirement or death of a
shareholder."' Important to the advantage of continuity of existence is
the transferability of a shareholder's stock. Transferability of ownership
is limited by the Act only in the sense that any transferee of a stock-
holder's shares must be a duly licensed professional in the profession
practiced by the corporation.11 The continuing existence of the corpora-
tion together with the ability of a shareholder to transfer ownership makes
it possible for the professional to enter into an equitable shareholder buy-
sell or corporate redemption agreement.
Naturally the loss to a personal-service corporation of a withdrawing
shareholder would necessarily tend to reduce the earning capacity of the
corporation more than would be the case for a typical business with sub-
stantial income-producing physical assets. Thus withdrawal of a pro-
fessional from the corporation would also reduce the value of the stock
to be redeemed or purchased by another shareholder or licensed out-
sider. But as most likely will be the case, the withdrawing shareholder
would probably have contributed substantial goodwill to the corporation
in leaving behind clients or patients who will continue to employ its
services. In order to insure the most equitable realization of the value
of such goodwill both to the corporation and to the withdrawing share-
holder, the Act provides for the possibility of the continuing use of his
name in the official corporate title."' The Act further protects the
... Some of the characteristics required for tax purposes that were established
in Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1934), such as continuity of life,
free transferability of interests, and centralization of management, can be achieved
in "modem" partnership agreements. However, these characteristics are not only
cumbersome and sometimes legally uncertain when achieved by a partnership
agreement, but they also endow the partnership with traditional corporate charac-
teristics that could result in treatment of the partnership as a corporation for
tax purposes.
'" N.C. GEx. STAT. § 55B-7 (Supp. 1969). The continuity of existence is
possible even if the professional corporation has only one licensed shareholder so
long as a licensed professional of the same profession becomes the transferee of
the shares.
" Id. § 55B-6.
" Id. § 55B-5. Both the North Carolina Board of Medical Examiner's regula-
tions and the regulations of the Council of the North Carolina Bar provide for
the preservation, upon proper authority, of a withdrawing bona fide shareholder's
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interest of a shareholder who has died by requiring, in the absence of
an agreement determining the equitable value of his shares, that the
corporation redeem them at their fair market value, but in no case will
the redemption price be less than the book value as of the month im-
mediately preceding his death.1
13
B. Centralization of Management
An additional advantage obtained through the corporate structure
that is not always possible in the traditional partnership is centralization
of management achieved because the shareholders can vote and elect
their directors. However, the Act specifically prohibits any stockholder
of the corporation from entering into a voting-trust arrangement or any
other type of agreement vesting in another person the authority to
exercise the voting power of any or all of the shareholder's stock." 4 Pre-
sumably the intent of the prohibition is to prevent shareholders from
vesting their voting rights in a nonprofessional. But the effect of this
provision seems to be unnecessarily over-reaching since it apparently
prohibits voting agreements among shareholders, which are permissible
under the general Business Corporation Act.";
C. Limited Liability of the Shareholder-Employee
The final principal advantage to be acquired by professionals operating
within the corporate form is that of limited liability to the shareholders.
The Act provides:
Nothing in this chapter shall be interpreted to abolish, modify,
restrict, limit or alter the law in this state applicable to the professional
relationship and liabilities between the person furnishing the services
and the person receiving such professional services, or the standards
of professional conduct applicable to the rendering therein of such
services.'1
Since a professional employee performing services is, as any corporate
employee, personally liable for his wrongful acts under the common law,
name. In addition, the Council of the North Carolina Bar in its regulations
requires the use of at least one shareholder's surname in the corporate name
(North Carolina Bar Regulations of Professional Corporations, Rule 2.1, 1969).
The Board of Medical Examiners' regulations do not (Board of Medical Ex-
aminers' Regulations of Professional Corporations, Rule 11-3, 1969).
"' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55B-7(b) (Supp. 1969).
2
1 1 Id. § 55B-6.
... See id. § 55-73 (1964)..1 oN.C. G N. STAT. § 55B-9 (Supp. 1969).
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this provision could have been intended to preserve possible vicarious
liability of a physician employed by a professional corporation for the
negligence of nonprofessional corporate employees under his control.
The provision also arguably preserves any personal contractual liability
of a professional employee for failure to produce a promised result although
employees of nonprofessional corporations are not liable for corporate
contracts. Since the statutory language refers only to the person who
furnishes and the person who receives services, the necessary implication
is that stockholders of the corporation enjoy the advantages of limited
liability in their capacity as shareholders. 1 7
IV. CONCLUSION
Tax advantages are certainly the most important incentives to forming
a professional corporation, but it is doubtful that tax laws covering some
of the employee fringe benefits, especially the pension and profit-sharing
plans, will remain as attractive in the future. Regardless of whether a
professional entity operates as a partnership or a corporation, its capacity
to generate income generally would be the same. Since the employee
fringe benefits are not "free," the professional usually would have to
accept less take-home pay in order to derive an advantage from them. As
a result of the necessity of the professional corporation carefully to conduct
its business as a corporate entity to withstand the close scrutiny of the
IRS, operational expenses for the smaller corporation likely would be
greater than for a partnership of the same size.
The corporate characteristics of continuity of existence and free trans-
ferability of interest can facilitate the estate planning of a shareholder.
While formal centralization of management may be an important factor in
achieving greater operational efficiencies in the larger professional entities,
in smaller practices centralization could be burdensome and undesirable.
Although liability appears to be limited to a significant degree, the possi-
bility of the realization of this advantage is unlikely because most corpo-
rations will find it safer to acquire sufficient liability insurance. And,
except for the attribute of limited liability, the effects of traditional
"'1 See O'Neill v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 359, 361-62 (N.D. Ohio 1968),
aff'd, 410 F.2d 888, 898 (6th Cir. 1969), which applied this same interpretation to
the limited-liability section of the Ohio Professional Association law, OHIO REv.
CoDE 1785.04 (Supp. 1961). The Ohio law is identical to the limited-liability sec-
tion of the North Carolina Professional Corporation Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55B-9
(Supp. 1969). See also GA. CODE ANN. § 84-4307 (Supp. 1961).
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